RE-IMAGINING FAIR HEARING IN NIGERIA: A CRITIQUE OF ABALAKA V MINISTER OF HEALTH, AND THE SUPREME COURT’S RESTRICTIVE APPROACH TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

Abstract

This paper discusses the Supreme Court decision in the recent case of Abalaka v Minister of Health (2025) 15 NWLR (Pt 1890) 1 and its implications for judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional protection of fair hearing under section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 applies only to courts and tribunals established by statute. Administrative bodies or non-statutory tribunals, by contrast, may seek redress only through judicial review. This article examines the effect of this narrow interpretation on Nigerian jurisprudence by comparing it with earlier authorities such as Denloye v Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Council (1968) 1 All NLR 306 and Garba and Others v University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 555 (SC). In those earlier decisions, the Supreme Court adopted a broader, functional, and rights-centred approach, holding that whenever civil rights are affected, procedural fairness must form an essential part of the decision-making process. Using a doctrinal and comparative approach, the paper analyses Nigerian case law, scholarly opinions, and comparative jurisprudence from other jurisdictions. The findings reveal that the Abalaka decision excludes several administrative bodies from the constitutional safeguards of fair hearing previously recognised under Nigerian law. Comparative legal systems generally favour a broader, effects-based approach, suggesting that the decision is inconsistent with prevailing global standards. The paper concludes by recommending an amendment of section 36(1) to clarify its scope and strengthen procedural fairness requirements applicable to administrative bodies.